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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a variety of labor market adjustment issues facing Russian
households from 1992 to 1996 on the basis of a panel data set which allows us to group the
sample respondents by demographic, occupational and job location features.
We employ multivariate specifications for analyzing patterns of job security and job
replacement concerns, involuntary layoffs and voluntary quits, forced unpaid leave and its
duration, monthly hours of work and short-time work, nonemployment spell and unemployment
incidence as they affected our respondents selected by demographic characteristics, occupation,
and region.
Among our principal finding is that men and women had increased fears of job loss and
increased pessimism about their reemployment prospects during the years considered here but
women had borne a greater burden of the majority of the "quantity" or employment adjustments.
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Russia's continuing transformation into a market economy is likely to bring about relative
gains for some groups while creating losses for others. The relative impact will also vary across
regions and occupations. Steady inflation control via fiscal and monetary discipline and the
restructuring of privatized factories can be expected to result in rising unemployment or
declining real wages or both with a varying impact among different groups and localities. For
example, restructuring of large enterprises may endanger the sheltered position of workers who
were formerly protected from the competitive pressures of a market economy. It is possible that
groups which traditionally received relatively low wages (for example, women) may gain as
firms begin competing domestically and internationally leading them to hire traditionally
underpriced labor. On the other hand, if factory managers continue favoring specific groups (for
example, an older comrade may be preferred to a new entrant in the workforce) or adhering to
traditional social norms (for example, a male worker may be hired and retained instead of a
female worker because the former is regarded as the preferred breadwinner), then young workers
and females may bear the brunt of the adjustment costs through job or wage loss. In that case,
managerial decisions hobbled by traditional practices rather than nascent market forces will
influence the distribution of the transition costs among different social groups. Women in
particular may experience greater wage losses or less job security or both than men. So also
would workers in the outlying regions in contrast to those in Moscow which has proliferating
job opportunities.
The pre-transition regime contained incentives for managers to retain excess employees',
decisions that while rational for the individual manager produced potentially significant losses to
society in terms of the foregone output that these workers would have produced if they had been
allocated to their most productive activities. Reallocating existing labor resources and bringing
'Gimpelson (1996, p.35) reports that overstating in industry under the old regime varied from
15 to 25 percent; Standing (1996, p. 15) reports that approximately 8 percent of the industrial labor
force was redundant. The combination of soft budget constraints and compensation that was linked to
plan fulfillment rather than cost savings provided managers with incentives to overstaff their
operations (see Gimpelson, 1996).
1
in market signals in employment decisions must be at the core of the transformation of Russia's
economy into a market system of resource allocation.
These problems have begun attracting the attention of scholars working on the adjustment
costs of the transition in emerging market economies. Among the issues posed are the following:
how has the transition affected the labor force participation and employment rates of men and
women (Standing, 1994a,b; Brainerd, 1996a)? How has the transition affected unemployment
rates of men and women, their relative job loss (Standing, 1994c, 1995), and the prevalence (and
duration) of forced administrative leaves and short-time schedules (Gimpelson, 1996)? What has
happened to overall wage inequality and its measure by gender, skill, and age (Standing, 1994;
Brainerd, 1997; Glinskaya and Mroz, 1996), and what has been the impact of these trends on
poverty in Russia (Mikhalev, 1996)?
Brainerd uses information based on monthly surveys of 3,000-4,000 randomly selected
individuals in 90 different areas of Russia conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public
Opinion Research (VtsIOM) between 1991 and 1994. She (1996a) concludes that decentralized
wage setting had resulted in the doubling of overall wage inequality between 1991 and 1994 and
a decline in female wages relative to male wages across all percentiles of the wage distribution.
Focusing on the gender gap in wages in Russia from 1992 to 1995, and using data for 3,000 to
6,000 households from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), Glinskaya and
Mroz (1996) suggest that the already marked segregation of the Russian labor market had
continued to grow, that all the important increase in the gender gap in wages had taken place at
the upper tail of the wage distributions, and that nearly all of these changes were due to highly
paid men's wages increasing more rapidly than those of women. Extending her inquiry to six
East European and three post-Soviet economies, Brainerd (1997) suggests a remarkable increase
in female relative wages in the former and a substantial decline in Russia and Ukraine, the latter
attributable to a tremendous widening of their wage distribution.
By contrast, Standing relies on information put together from questionnaires
administered by managers in a random sample of 501 factories (the Russian Labor Flexibility
Survey). He finds that employment decline beginning with voluntary attrition and unfilled
vacancies toward the end of 1991 was moving into substantial layoffs in 1992. Again, higher
wages for some occupations (accompanied by bonuses and entitlements) and wider wage
differentials (with erosion of wages and benefits in the lower end) in some privatized and quasi-
private firms had begun to appear in 1992 signaling labor market fragmentation. As for women's
position in the labor market, it was still strong by international standards in early 1992: women
accounted for about half the share in employment; there was less occupational segregation by
gender than exists in most countries although women may have made up larger proportions of
lower status jobs within each occupational category. Standing also found that the use of
administrative leaves and short-time schedules had increased between 1992 and 1994-
95(Standing, 1996).
Gimpelson (1996) similarly uses enterprise level, administrative records from four firms
to look at the ways in which enterprises have restructured their human resources during the
transition. He reports high rates of separations extending through 1995, with worker- initiated
separations (quits) rather than factory layoffs accounting for the bulk of all separations.
Furthermore, separation rates have exceeded hiring rates, so that downsizing of the work force of
enterprises seems to be primarily accomplished through attrition rather than through disruptive
and politically costly layoffs.2 Researchers have speculated, though, that some of the separations
attributed to quits may in fact be separations encouraged by managers through reduced wages,
short-time schedules, unpaid administrative leaves and unpaid wages (see Gimpelson, 1996, p.
18).
By the end of 1996, the transition was in full swing: the inflation rate had been brought
down from an estimated 2,500 percent in 1992 to 26 percent in 1996; the economy had shrunk by
half its 1992 size; the unemployment rate was estimated at 9.5 percent toward the end of 1996;
and the privatized sector was reported to employ 80 percent of the workforce. However,
restructuring of large enterprises was spotty and, by January 1997, wage arrears to the workforce
in the amount of approximately $9 billion signified declining revenues in the state treasury and
2LayofTs also impose high costs on firms as severance payments can be as high as three
months of wages. In addition, the excess wage tax encouraged managers to retain low skilled
workers, who might otherwise be fired, in order to reduce the average enterprise wage and thereby
avoid paying the tax. (For details about the excess wage tax, see Layard and Richter, 1994, p. 98.)
mounting cash-flow problems in the farms and factories. At the same time, the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) data set (to be described below) was beginning to be
available enabling researchers to investigate at the household level the impact of these factors on
Russia's labor market.
In this paper, we analyze gender and other demographic differences in labor market
adjustments across occupation groups and regions during Russia's continuing transition to a
market economy. Our focus here is on the alternative ways in which quantity, or employment,
adjustments have been undertaken. These adjustment mechanisms include actual adjustments in
numbers employed, accomplished by layoffs and hiring rates in conjunction with the level of
worker-initiated separations, and more indirect adjustments in the employment of labor services
through such practices as the use of short-time schedules, fixed-term contracts, and
administrative leaves.3 In Section I, we discuss (pre-1985) Soviet practices relating to labor
allocation, gender differences in employment and earnings, occupation choices by education, age
and location, and how they have changed over time for men and women, for workers young and
old with varying levels of education, and among different regions and occupations. We also
briefly discuss the changes in employment policy and wage setting under Mikhail Gorbachev
(1985-1991) and under Boris Yeltsin starting from early 1992, in addition to the important
aggregate trends in Russian labor markets since 1992. These details give us the necessary
background and context that informs our interpretation of the estimates from our empirical
analysis. In Section II, we describe the data, define the variables, and discuss the univariate
patterns in our various job security measures. In Section III, we analyze the demographic,
occupation and job location patterns of job security and other features of Russia's emerging
labor market such as forced unpaid leave, duration of nonemployment, voluntary quits versus
involuntary layoffs, and job tenure in a multivariate context. Finally, in Section IV, we
3Labor market adjustments to variations in product demand may also take place by varying the
price of labor, i.e. wages and benefits, rather than employment levels. In a separate paper we analyze
the role played by wage flexibility, including the important issue of escalating wage arrears (one way
in which wage flexibility may be accomplished), during the transition. We also investigate variations
in these practices across gender, occupations and regions of Russia, and evaluate their impact on
welfare and poverty.
summarize our findings.
I. Soviet Employment and Labor Allocation Practices
We first describe Soviet employment and labor allocation policies until 1985 as they
affected job choices for workers in general and for women in particular, for employees
depending on their age, education and location, followed by a brief review of the relevant
changes under Mikhail Gorbachev during 1985-1991 and thereafter under Boris Yeltsin under
whose leadership the transition to a market economy has gathered speed.
Labor Allocation and Worker Employment Until 1985
Under Stalin's version of the Soviet employment system (trudoustrystvo), Soviet citizens
were required to work and the state was obliged to provide them with employment. The 1936
Constitution declared that" 'work in the USSR is a duty, a matter of honour for every able-
bodied citizen—He who does not work shall not eat.' Citizens had the right to work and to
'guaranteed employment'. In the 1977 constitution citizens were not only given the right to work
but also the choice of a trade or profession." (Lane, 1986, p. 9).
The planners sought to create full employment in the context of fast-paced
industrialization geared toward heavy industry and state ownership of productive assets. The
process was overadministered from the start: workers were allocated to specific industries which
in turn were assigned production targets. (The rigors of workforce allocation varied from time to
time as will be discussed below.) Cadres and specialists were trained by numbers and types
according to plan requirements. Youngsters were assigned to higher education or vocational
training schools to meet plan targets. Wage and salary scales were fixed by type of work and
location of job4. Needless to say, employment planning was less than perfect: there were
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"The tariff system is designed to reward the 'scientifically measurable' contribution of each
worker, in accordance with the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', by means of a system of
national job evaluation, supplemented by coefficients for unpleasant conditions, inhospitable regions,
training, industrial sector, and so on. The drawing up of tariff scales is such a centralized and
bureaucratic process that the incentive impact of the tariff wage is barely discernible on the shop
floor." (Rutland, 1986, p. 195).
mismatches between job preferences of potential employees and requirements of prospective
employers (Gloeckner, 1986; Mamie, 1986); at the same time, centrally determined wage
guidelines may have been insufficient in explaining workers' job selection which was influenced
by opportunities to earn bonuses, and extra incomes elsewhere (Malle, 1986)5. In any case, the
planners persisted in managed labor allocation, and differentiated wage scales (with periodic
variations) until their relaxation in the late 1980s under Gorbachev and their abandonment after
1992.
During the Stalinist industrialization drive (1928-1940),"... elements of compulsion were
present in the system of labour allocation. Millions of forced labourers obviously had no control
over the place and nature of their work. ...The general picture, however, is one of an employment
policy still in practice based on a free labour-market. For the majority of Soviet workers in the
1930s, the existence of a highly authoritarian government, willing to use harsh sanctions against
its population to achieve its ends, nonetheless did not mean the end of freedom to choose their
place of work. The factor which eventually inaugurated the era of compulsory labour direction
was not Stalinist industrialisation but war." (Barber, 1986, p. 63).
Even under Stalin's authoritarian regime, Soviet planners sought to resolve the dilemma
between socialist egalitarianism and market incentives by tipping wage policies in the direction
of increased rather than diminished (administered) wage differentials (Bergson, 1946;
Yanowitch, 1963; Chapman, 1970, pp. 7-14). "There is evidence that wage differentials were
wide and increasing from the early 1930s up to and including the Second World War"
(Chapman, 1991, p. 179). There was, however, a social contract, which consisted of the
provision of a guaranteed job and "...low and stable prices for food and housing in return for
showing up at work, docility and obedience on the part of the workers." (Chapman, 1991, p.
177).
The wartime legislation via which state agencies could freeze workers in their jobs or
force them to change their occupations was repealed in 1954. "Once workers were free to change
5
"Material rewards (i.e. wages) consist of two elements: the tariff wage (about 70 percent of
total earnings) and the various bonuses for overfulfilment, innovation, and so on." (Rutland, 1986, p.
195).
jobs, it became necessary to review the entire structure of wage rates, to bring relative wages into
accord with changes that had occurred in the demand for and supply of labour of different sorts
and to make the wage system more efficient as an allocator of labour." (Chapman, 1991, p. 179).
The reforms consisted of changes in the centrally determined basic wage and salary rates and in
the rules for compensation for conditions of work, geographical location, and for incentive pay.
As a result, an effective minimum wage was introduced in 1957 and a virtual ceiling was set on
upper level salary rates. (Details are in Chapman, 1991, pp. 179-180.) These changes had a
dramatic impact: " In industry, salaried workers earned 46 per cent more than wage earners in
1955 but this advantage had fallen to only 9 per cent in 1980 and 6 per cent in 1985. ...By the late
1970s and early 1980s, some Soviet economists had begun to suggest that wage differentials had
become too narrow to provide effective incentives. Concern was increasingly expressed over the
fact that some engineers and others with professional education were taking blue-collar jobs for
better pay, thus wasting their training." (Chapman, 1991, p. 180).
While the skewed wage structure resulted in perverse choices by workers, they
nevertheless changed jobs in response to perceived advantages from alternative employment.
(This feature is discussed below.) Of greater concern however were problems arising from the
"taut" economic plans which plagued factory managers in their workforce utilization. The goal of
transforming the economy into "a gigantic building site for projects of capital construction" via
physical output targets imposed from the top on managers of factories (especially in machine
building and raw materials) created excess demand for inputs6 and labor.7 Managers tended to
reasons for this are well known. "The more inputs the enterprise can have allocated to it,
the better, so far as the management is concerned. If these inputs are incorporated in the production
plan, they will be covered in the enterprise's financial plan, even if planned losses are involved. In
general, the enterprise cannot be penalised for high costs incorporated in its plan: there are no
competitors to undercut it, and no fear of business failure." (Hanson, 1986, p. 88).
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"Soviet planners regularly underestimate labour demand by large amounts. In other words the
sum of enterprise labour-force plans (certainly after 'corrections' within the plan period, and probably
even after that) tends to exceed any aggregate labour-force plan for the state sector as a whole. The
actual demand for labour therefore probably exceeds the available supply. Vacancies outnumber
unemployed job-seekers; or to put it differently, the average vacancy remains unfilled longer than the
average job-seeker remains out of work." (Hanson, 1986, p. 94).
hoard labor and conceal labor reserves. (Harrison, 1986, pp. 74-75). They expected to profit
from this practice. "First, the larger the enterprise labor force, the higher the basic pay scales of
management. Second, labor is worth hoarding anyway because of the irregularity of material
supplies and the associated need for 'storming'; the possibility that your plan target will be
increased during the year; the possibility that the local Party secretary will call up unexpectedly
and requisition some of your employees for road-building, road-sweeping, harvest work and the
like; and the fundamental fact that bonuses are in practice linked above all to total output. Third,
the continued predominance of the output target... has a further effect on labour demand."
(Hanson, 1986, pp. 88-89). "To the Soviet manager the additional labour has no effective cost
since his budget constraints are soft, not hard." (Hanson, 1986, p. 94). The economy was thus
characterized by overall labor shortage and varying amounts of hidden labor reserves in factories.
Did the Soviet workers manage to beat the system as well? Up to a point. Labor turnover,
defined to include workers who quit their jobs voluntarily or who were dismissed for violations
of the work rules, had been persistently high and steady in the post-Stalin era beginning the mid-
1950s. Such turnover, which Soviet sources described as arising from "dissatisfaction with
working conditions," included two out of every ten industrial workers and three out of every ten
construction workers (Powell, 1981, p. 101). Younger workers were far more apt than their older
colleagues to quit their jobs. "In the [former] RSFSR, for example, workers under thirty years of
age are responsible for 60-65 percent of all labor turnover..." (Powell, 1981, p. 109). One reason
may be that approximately one out of every five workers under thirty did not do work for which
he or she was trained (Powell, 1981, p. 111).
It is doubtful if the high turnover by labor (including dismissals of delinquent workers by
management) in search of higher pay or better housing or more attractive job environment
prompted more efficient use of labor resources by managers or more productive work effort by
workers. Both were constrained by systemic factors: the former concentrated on fulfilling output
targets without concern for wage-bill minimization and the latter lacked the incentives "to put
their best foot forward" in view of the endemic shortages of consumer goods. The social contract
had degenerated into "they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work for them." There was job
security but poor utilization of labor resources by managers and workers.
Women and Employment Policies Until 1985
Within the overall pattern of job security marked by poor utilization of the workforce and
its significant turnover, the participation of women raised specific issues.
Two features in this regard are noteworthy. First, the Soviet era participation rates of
women in the workforce8 had been among the highest in the world. The overall labor
participation rate increased from 65.80 percent in 1950 to 80.52 percent in 1979 having stabilized
at that level thereafter. Women's participation rate went up from 59.9 percent in 1950 to 83.1
percent in 1979. "In the Soviet Union the participation rate for women between 20 and 40 years
of age, the time of child-birth and care , is ... very high. In 1970 it reached 85.1 per cent for
women between 20 and 29 years of age and 91.2 per cent for women between 30 and 39 years
old." (Pietsch, 1986, p. 179). Second, in 1970 (during which the sex composition of the labor
supply was close to normal), women accounted for 50.7 percent of employed compared to 48.3
percent in 1960. "This was at a time when the proportion of women in the working-age
population was steadily falling, continuing the post-war trend, as normal demographic patterns
were re-asserted." (Kostakov, 1991, p. 88).
The high female participation rates (continuing after the breakup of the former Soviet
Union in December 1991) had resulted from several factors, among them official policies to draw
housewives into the workplace in the face of mounting labor shortage, continuing economic
pressures on their part to earn a second income, and above all, the ideological emphasis on the
intrinsic value of work outside the home.
At the same time, family chores took an unprecedented share of working women's time
as they continue to do so now: "Although men and women devote roughly equal time to paid
employment and physiological needs, working women devote on average 28 hours per week to
housework, compared to about 12 hours per week for men; it has also been found that men have
50 percent more leisure time than women." (Lapidus, 1981, p. 134). Part-time employment was
8The labor participation rates are calculated by dividing the people employed in state
enterprises and administration and collective farms with the population between 16 and 54-59 years
of age.
rare because enterprise and administration managers were not interested in such arrangements.
Less than 2 percent of employed women had part-time jobs in the late 1980s (Kostakov, 1991, p.
90). Again, women had lower enrollment rate in programs to raise professional qualifications
and add to their technical skills; women industrial workers also participated less frequently in
sociopolitical activities such as attending factory production meetings or becoming Communist
Party members (Lapidus, 1981, p. 126). The obligatory dual roles inside and outside the home
left women less time for upgrading their skills and advancing their job prospects via networking.
According to one survey, 85 percent of the male-female earnings differential resulted from
unequal opportunities for women to advance their careers. (Details are in Chapman, 1991, p.
186.) There is no evidence that the situation has changed in that regard at present.
But were women discriminated against? Cultural norms reinforced by official policies
suggested sexual identification of occupations as "men's work" and "women's work" based on
biological and sexual stereotypes. Of the 1,100 occupations for which training had been offered
at Soviet technical-vocational institutions for men and women, only 714 had been available to
women (Lapidus, 1981, p. 129) At the same time, the terms of female (and not male)
employment had been adjusted by legislation to accommodate household and family
responsibilities "as primarily and properly the domain of women." Thus , women and women
only had dual roles. (Lapidus, 1981, p. 130).
Explicit gender discrimination in the former Soviet and current Russian workplace is
however difficult to track down. Was the legal requirement of equal pay for equal work
implemented by ensuring that women were placed in positions matching their skills and training?
Doubts persist. "Women are ... frequently overqualified for the jobs they hold. A recent study of
industrial enterprises in Taganrog found that 40 percent of all female workers with higher or
secondary specialized education occupied low-skill industrial positions, compared to 6 percent of
comparable males." (Lapidus, 1981, p. 128).
The continuing result of the compulsory dual role for Soviet women has been their over
representation in jobs with low skill, less responsibility and authority, and more flexible work
schedules. Some occupations have evolved and remained female. "The largest share of female
labor in the Soviet economy today can be found in agriculture;...In industry, as in the economy as
10
a whole, women are heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of areas and are
significantly underrepresented in others. Although half of all industrial workers are women, three
industrial branches-machine building and metalworking, textiles and the food industry-account
for 70 percent of all female industrial development; women comprise over 80 percent of food and
textile workers and over 90 percent of garment workers, but less than 30 percent of the workers
in coal, lumber, electric power, and mineral extraction. ...even as women begin to enter the
middle and upper ranks of industry, they continue to predominate in low-level, unmechanized,
and unskilled jobs. ...Between 1962-69, women accounted for 96 percent of the growth in manual
employment; women still account for 80 percent of the auxiliary workers in industry, 80 percent
of those engaged in packing, and 86 percent of all women workers doing grading and sorting. "
(Lapidus, 1981, pp. 125-126).
The uneven distribution of women in industry and occupations and their
underrepresentation in jobs of high skill and responsibility resulted in their relatively lower
earnings, 65 to 70 percent of male earnings. In particular, their underrepresentation in industrial
branches with high wage levels and wide differentials—such as heavy industry and construction—
and their high concentration in light industry and services with low wage levels and narrower
differentials contributed to the earnings gap (Lapidus, 1981, p. 127). "In construction, where
women constituted 28 percent of the labor force in 1975, monthly earnings averaged 176.8
rubles; in public health and physical culture, where females make up 84 percent of the work
force, they averaged 102.3 rubles." (Lapidus, 1981, p. 127).
At the time of Gorbachev's rise to Soviet leadership in March 1985, Soviet women's
participation rate in the economy was inordinately high at about 85 percent; their employment
rate was a little over 50 percent. However, with involuntary dual roles at home and in the work
place, limited opportunities for skill upgrading and job networking, women were heavily
concentrated in female jobs with low wages and narrow wage differentials. Their prospects of
benefiting from the limited labor market and wage policy changes under Gorbachev, and of
safeguarding their job security or advancing their job opportunities under the escalating labor
market changes beginning January 1992 were conditioned by this dominant feature.
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Education, Age, Location and Employment Until 1985
Did the employment policies until 1985 of administered wage scales (supplemented by
incentive payments) and planned targeting of labor requirements by various categories result in
matching the resulting supply with demand?
We first discuss the connection between education and employment.
Education and Employment: There was mismatch between the aspirations of young, school-
leavers and the job opportunities available to them. In 1980, there were "approximately 2.3
applicants for every vuz [higher education institution beyond the secondary school], and
approximately 40 percent of all school-leavers ...entering the labor force with no vocational
training and low motivation for the blue-collar production jobs ... open to them." (Mamie, 1986,
p. 217). As a result, there was high labor turnover (mentioned earlier) and low work incentive
among the young.
At the same time, the skills of the high-level cadres among the engineering and technical
personnel (i.e. Inzhenerno-tekhnicheskie rabotniki, or ITR) were not matched with the needs of
industry. The situation was not only marked by discrepancies arising from the excessively
narrow profiles of the specialists and the needs of the workplace but also from highly qualified
technical personnel working in blue-collar occupations. These distortions implied losses on
educational investments, lower job satisfaction, and higher job turnover among qualified
specialists doing low-level work.
For given education levels, the employment prospects of the older workers had pluses and
minuses.
Age and Employment: Young, newcomers with better educational qualifications lacked
management savvy and experience which put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis older employees.
Even the ITR management cadres lacked organizational and leadership abilities (Gloeckner,
1986, p. 226). They feared responsibility and conflicts in the workplace. Senior, more
experienced staff had an edge in getting promoted to managerial-technical jobs which
occasionally proliferated in large factories because top management used its job placement
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autonomy to promote old comrades and create new senior positions: positions of senior
engineers, senior specialists, and chiefs of sections and bureaus with flexible labor norms
proliferated. At the same time, older workers also got shunted to clerical jobs and auxiliary
plants (Malle, 1986, p. 131).
Workers, young and old, had opportunities to upgrade skills, improve job prospects, and
prevent demotions. "Each year about 6 million workers learn a new profession and more than 20
million study to improve their qualifications. More than 70 percent of the new entrants are
trained on the job by enterprises." (Malle, 1986, p. 131).
The quality of training however varied depending on enterprise size (larger factories had
better facilities), type of industry (the defense and export sectors and the automobile industry had
greater incentive to promote skills) and management interest (managers were interested in
maintaining production rhythm and preventing potential labor turnover among better trained
workers). In general, young male specialists were more inclined to take advantage of
opportunities to upgrade their skills than young entrants in the job market, female workers and
older employees.
Finally, employment prospects improved ceteris paribus with ability to migrate to places
with better job availabilities.
Employment, Migration and Regional Variations
Labor migration in the Soviet Union was unprecedented in the 1930s induced by the
outward push of farm collectivization and the urban pull of industrialization. The policies
consisted of channeling the flow of migrants in desired regions and industries and preventing
excessive labor turnover which characterized the period. Resident permits {propiski) were
compulsory for migrating to towns and urban settlements. Among the methods of directing labor
movements were organized recruitment (Orgnabor), agricultural settlement, compulsory
placement of graduating students, and social exhortations (obshchestvennye prizyvy) pushed by,
among others, the Communist youth organization (Komsomol). Most of these controls and
migration channels except the passport requirement were relaxed in the early 1950s after the
Second World War.
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Among the consequences of these policies for the purpose of our analysis, the following
are noteworthy:
Despite the passport system, close to twenty-five million people had migrated to cities
during 1956-70 (Helgeson, 1986, p. 148). But the pace of rural out-migration had slowed from
1976 which marked a new trend. People moved within a region often commuting in well-settled
urban areas. Population growth in large cities, among them Moscow and St. Petersburg, had
slowed, the result of administrative entry arrangements in both, yielding to faster growth rates in
medium-sized towns.
Young adults were energetically recruited via Orgnabor channels and Komsomol appeals
to move to regions targeted for rapid growth and specific projects. The labor shortage in Western
Siberia endowed with oi l , and of the resource-rich Far East was ultimately overcome via such
methods (Helgeson, 1986, p. 163). Population settlements in the climatically hostile North-East,
and the extreme north to develop the nickel industry, for example, subsequently proved to be
economically unviable decisions requiring population transfers currently.
The cities continued to be the magnets drawing young adults in search of higher
education and better training, and qualified specialists looking for job opportunities, cultural
activities, and marriage partners. As a result, large enterprises in cities were overmanned by
specialists who chose to work as blue-collar workers whereas new plants in remote regions with
harsh climate were short of such personnel.
The deliberate construction of self-contained settlements especially in the defense
industry towns of Armaz, Krasnoyarsk, and Chelyabinsk in Western Siberia have created
massive problems of job security and potential job losses among highly skilled engineers and
technicians in this region in view of the drastic cutback of military items. These company towns
also lack the financial and managerial infrastructure of Moscow and St. Petersburg which could
diversify job opportunities for the skilled unemployed.
These Soviet era employment practices and their legacy suggest that women and older
workers, settled in low-level jobs and less prone to upgrade their skills, were poorly equipped to
survive potential job losses resulting from competitive market pressures. Skilled male workers
in urban factories especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg were likely to surmount them by
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landing better jobs. Workers in general employed in the economically unviable regions and
industries and in defense factories faced uncertain labor market prospects as the market economy
reforms advanced.
These reforms relating to employment and labor market practices, slow under Gorbachev
gathered speed after 1992.
Gorbachev and Labor Market Reforms
The main features of the wage reform under Gorbachev, which were introduced in 1986
and completed in 1989 (except in agriculture) consisted of revisions in wage differentials and
centrally mandated wage increases requiring enterprises to finance them from their own funds.
(Details are in Chapman, 1991, pp. 180-184.) The self-financing of wage bills was intended to
discipline enterprise cash flows, compel managers to release hoarded labor and improve the
productivity of the remaining workers.
At the same time, cooperatives and individual labor activity, and leasing arrangements in
farms and factories were multiplying, the former creating alternative employment opportunities,
and the latter providing incentives to worker collectives. There were no direct controls over
incomes and wages in cooperatives. Income from individual labor activity was subject to
personal taxation (Chapman, 1991, pp. 188-189).
Three results followed from these measures. First, overall earnings and earning
differentials increased especially among cooperative members. By 1987, the rate of growth of
employee earnings in industry had outstripped the rate of growth of industrial productivity.
Industrial enterprises had failed to exercise hard budget constraints and had to be bailed out via
subsidies from the state budget which in turn added to the budget deficits (Desai, 1989, pp. 4-5).
Second, overall unemployment in the economy (of those without a job and seeking employment)
stood at 2 million or under 2 percent of the employed in 1989 (Chapman, 1991, p. 183). In 1988,
layoffs however were much lower than labor turnover: "In industry, the rate of labour turnover
has been nine times greater than that of workers' release (12.6 and 1.4 per cent of employment
respectively)." (Maslova, 1991, p. 136). Finally, the layoffs initially affected women and workers
nearing the pension age, and skilled workers who could not find alternative jobs via placement
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services. Labor turnover had the expected pattern:between 1985 and 1987, people under 30 had
become more mobile than those over 30; again men were slightly more mobile than women but
women's mobility had increased while men's had decreased, the former however remaining
lower than the latter. (Details are in Maslova, 1991, pp. 137-138.)
The reforms initiated in 1992 by Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar were qualitatively
different with critical implications for job security and employment layoffs in the economy.
Implications of Post-1992 Reforms for Russian Labor Market
These reforms increasingly enforced hard budget constraints on farms and factories by
sharply curtailing budgetary support. The privatization of factories (which were to begin
restructuring by mid-1995) was also aimed at belt tightening and release of redundant workers by
managers. At the same time, privately owned businesses in small-scale industry, trade and
services were calculated to create new jobs. Wages and salaries of employees in the state sector
and pensions to retirees were raised from time to time. Employee compensation in the rest of the
economy was to be determined by employers in response to market forces.9
How have these dramatic changes influenced Russian workers' employment situation and
job prospects? While the above aggregate patterns paint a broad picture of labor market trends
during the transition, they give us only limited insight into the demographic distribution of the
costs of the transition. Furthermore, aggregate statistics do not help us uncover the causes of
these trends. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the transition on workers' employment
experiences from various perspectives by analyzing issues such as workers' view of job security
and alternative job availability; the duration of their nonemployment10; the likelihood of their
between 1992 and 1995 mobility was high :Goskomstat estimated that approximately
31 percent of employees in industry left their job per year (see Gimpelson, p. 12).
I0Our measure of "nonemployment", i.e. how long it has been since a respondent (who is not
currently employed) last worked, is based on the survey question "How many months ago did you
leave your last place of work?" While we would like to have a measure of unemployment duration,
i.e. the length of time that the individual has been without a job and has been actively searching for
employment, we do not have information on job search by respondents prior to 1992, the first year of
our data. (We could however create a measure of unemployment duration for relatively short spells,
i.e. spells that began after 1992.)
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being unemployed and being forced to take unpaid leave and the duration of these leaves; then-
hours of work and the prevalence of short-time work schedule; the likelihood of workers
quitting their jobs or being laid off; and their job tenure with current employers. We investigate
these issues as they affect women (relative to men) and workers of different ages with varying
education and in different occupations and regions.
The answers to these questions based on household survey data, which we discuss
immediately below, help us provide precise and multi-faceted measures of the social costs of
Russia's transition to a market economy.
II. Data and Analytical Framework
Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey which is
a nationally representative household-based panel of the Russian people. The RLMS project has
currently gone through two phases, each phase comprising a panel of households with interviews
conducted for every member of the household. Phase I consists of four rounds of interviews
carried out during 1992 and 1993, and provided information on 16,641 individuals from 6,334
households. Phase II is based on a different set of households (11,284 individuals from 3,750
households in Round V) and a modified sampling scheme, and has undergone three rounds of
interviews, Rounds V-VII, each fielded in the Fall of 1994,1995 and 1996 respectively. The
detailed information of demographic and employment characteristics in the data enables us to
systematically analyze the labor market experiences of the Russian people as the transition from
a planned economy has proceeded.11
Analytical Framework
The survey respondents were asked a series of questions dealing with their concerns
about their labor market prospects, along with questions dealing with their actual employment
1
'Detailed information on the structure of the survey, including the questionnaires and the data
sources may be obtained over the Internet at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms
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experiences. Among these features are the respondents' worries about job loss, their hoped-for
chances of finding a similar job in the likelihood of plant closure, the frequency and duration of
unpaid leave, monthly hours of work and the occurrence of short-time schedules, the length of
nonemployment and occurrence of unemployment, experiences with voluntary and involuntary
separations from their prior job, and job tenure measured as the length of employment on the
current job.
We first use their responses for describing these features for each year from 1992 to 1996
for males and females (in Tables la-lc) . Women however may be unfavorably placed with
regard to these features not only because of gender but also gender-related factors such as age,
education, type of occupation and job location . We therefore analyze for each year the gender
and other demographic differences in our dependent variables in a multivariate context by
introducing additional explanatory variables based on the respondents' age, education,
employment in an organization fully or partly owned by the government, occupation (from
among nine possibilities) and location (in one of the eight regions of Russia). The dependent
variables used are: job security (the variable chanf) and perceived prospects of finding a similar
job in case of layoff (the variable findjb) in Table 2; voluntary and involuntary job loss (the
variables quit and layoff) in Table 3; the likelihood and duration of compulsory unpaid leave
(the variables complv and dayslv), and the length of time that the respondent has worked for the
current employer (the variable tenure) in Table 4; monthly hours of work (the variable hours)
and the likelihood of being on a short-time schedule defined as working forty or fewer hours per
month (the variable shours) in Table 5; and 5 nonemployment spell duration for the currently
jobless (the variable udur) and the likelihood of being unemployed (the variables unemb,
unemjg, unems) in Table 6.
Our purpose in the exercise (of Tables 2 to 6) is to analyze whether women's position
with regard to job security and other variables of concern (from Table to Table) in the years 1992
to 1996 continues to be unfavorable when other potentially gender-related explanatory variables
are introduced in the specifications. In Table 7, we extend this analysis to see whether there is a
worsening trend in women's relative situation with regard to each of our measures of
employment security, turnover, and unemployment analyzed in Table 2-6.
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We analyze our results by first presenting the gender estimates of the multivariate
specifications beginning with job security as the dependent variable (Table 2), immediately
turning to the question of whether the job security of women relative to men had worsened over
time (Table 7, columns 2 and 3). Our analysis of the other dependent variables has a similar
sequencing of discussion of the gender differentials followed by that of its trend. The
definitions of the dependent variables are stated in Appendix Table 1. The explanatory variables
are defined and briefly described in Appendix Tables 2 and 3.
Descriptive Features
Tables la-lc below report means (or proportions) and standard deviations of the
dependent variables by gender and year. The survey questions that were used to generate these
variables are given in Appendix Table I.12
With regard to gender differences, we see that women were significantly more concerned
than men that they might lose their jobs (chanj)', significantly more uncertain than men that they
would be able to find comparable employment if they lost their jobs (findjb); and significantly
more likely to have been forced to take unpaid leave (comph). For example, 8.2 percent of
currently employed women in 1996 had been forced at some time on their current job to take
unpaid leave, whereas 7.1 percent of currently employed men had been so forced.13 These
differences are present in the years under consideration except 1992, the first year of the
transition, for which information on compulsory leaves was not available. We also see that in
1993, soon after the start of the transition, there was no gender difference in the duration of
compulsory leaves (dayslv). Such leaves, which, on average, were significantly longer for men in
l2When we take the mean of a dummy variable, we get the proportion of people in the sample
with the attribute that the dummy reflects. For example, the variable quit is a dummy variable which
is equal to 1 if a person quit his or her job between 1992 and 1993, and is equal to zero if he or she
did not quit the job between 1992 and 1993. Hence, 0.082 in the top panel of Table la, in the column
labeled 1992, indicates that approximately 8 percent of the females in our sample, who were
employed in 1992, quit their job between 1992 and 1993.
I3Similar cursory interpretation of the values for the variables chanj and findjb is problematic
because the responses follow an ordinal scale from 1 to 4 for chanj and from 1 to 9 for findjb.
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1994, had reversed their pattern in 199514 and then achieved equality in 1996: while women
experienced leave durations in 1995 of about 60 days on average in contrast to 40 days for men,
in 1996 both men and women experienced leaves of 53 to 54 days on average.
In addition to compulsory, or administrative leaves, other forms of hidden unemployment
(or underemployment) included reduced hours and short-time work. We see in Table lb that,
among people with jobs, women worked fewer hours on average than men in all years, and while
average monthly hours of work declined between 1992 and 1993 for men and women, hours
largely trended upward from 1993 through 1996.15 We also see that the likelihood of working a
short-time schedule, defined as 40 hours or less on average per month, was significantly greater
for women than for men in all years. Again, the prevalence short work hours followed an
inverted U shape for men and women, peaking in 1994 for both, with essentially no difference in
this pattern between the start of the transition (1992) and 1996 except for a significant
(monotonic) decline between 1994 and 1996.
Among those not employed at the time of each survey, we see that the duration of
nonemployment (since their last job) was significantly longer for women than for men in all
years: approximately 20 months for women and 16 months for men in 1995 and 1996.16 Women
also experienced a higher occurrence of unemployment in all years and for a number of
alternative definitions of unemployment.17 Among the reasons for job separations, we notice
l4This pattern is consistent with an increased reliance on laying off women as a way of
absorbing the unemployment shocks associated with macroeconomic brakes and enterprise
restructuring during the transition.
l5These calculations of work hours only relate to the respondents' main job and ignore the
influence of secondary jobs: increased multiple job holding during the transition would tend to
mitigate our reported trend in hours. In future work, we plan to analyze the patterns of multiple job
holding over the transition.
l6Our analysis of nonemployment duration focuses on durations of five years or less and is
limited to respondents not older than 55 years. We impose these restrictions because longer
durations may well reflect permanent labor force withdrawals and older respondents are more likely
to have retired.
17This does not hold for the BLS (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) unemployment definition
in 1993 due to a surprising dip in female unemployment.
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that women had a higher occurrence of layoffs18 than men in 1992 and 1993 ( in both years, the
difference however is statistically not significant), and in both years, men had a significantly
higher frequency of quits than women. Perhaps women were forced to leave jobs whereas men
quit voluntarily. Finally, among currently employed workers, women had significantly longer
tenure on their current jobs than men in 1994,1995, and 1996: in 1996, the average tenure was
approximately 92 months for women and 77 months for men representing over a year's gender
difference in tenure on the current job.19
Turning to the persistence of unfavorable features of the labor market during the
transition, we notice that, among the statistically significant measures for women and men, there
was an increase in fear of job loss; an increase in the uncertainty of finding a comparable
employment if they lost their job; an increase, though not monotonic, in the likelihood of being
forced to take unpaid leave; a monotonic increase in the duration of compulsory leave for
women, and a nonmonotonic and weaker increase in duration for men; an increase in
nonemployment duration; and an increase in the percentage of job separations due to quitting by
men during the early years of the transition. Finally, we also see that the average tenure on the
current job declined between 1994 and 1996, possibly reflecting the influence of macroeconomic
brakes and industrial restructuring and attendant job loss, and increased labor mobility in
response to market incentives.20 These descriptive features in Tables la-lc indicate distinct
gender differences in perceived and actual job stability. In order to determine whether these
differences were in fact due to gender per se, or due to other factors that influenced job security
and which were correlated with gender (for example, gender differences in occupation), we now
18The likelihood of layoffs for women is based on the percentage of women who were not
employed at the time of the survey but who had held paid jobs at some time in the past and who had
left their previous jobs on account of being laid off. Such a comparison of the occurrence of layoff,
which is conditional on a prior job layoff for women, does not allow us to say if women were in
general more or less likely than men to experience layoffs.
l9Data on job tenure was, unfortunately, only collected in Phase II (1994 to 1996).
20The question of whether these increases over time constitute statistically significant trends in
the dependent variables (such as job loss) and their relative gender differentials is analyzed in Table 7
on the basis of statistical tests reported in the Table.
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turn to a multivariate analysis of these patterns in Table 2-6.
III. Demographic, Occupation and Job Location Differences and and Multivariate Analysis
We begin with gender differences in concerns about job security and job replacement
followed by an analysis of trends in these differences over the period (Tables 2 and 7).
Gender Differences in Job Security and Job Replacement Concerns
A positive (negative) parameter in Table 2 indicates a greater (lesser) concern about job
loss. For example, the positive "female" coefficient relating to the dependent variable chanj
(column 2) indicates that women were more concerned that they might lose their job, whereas
the negative "education" coefficient indicates that people with higher levels of education were
less concerned that they would lose their job. Similarly, a positive (negative) parameter estimate
relating to the dependent variable findjb (column 3) indicates a greater (lesser) concern of
finding comparable reemployment conditional on a closure of the employee's enterprise. For
example, the positive "female"coefficient indicates that women were more concerned about
finding comparable reemployment, and the negative "education" coefficient indicates that
people with higher education were less concerned about finding a comparable job.
With these qualifications, points in mind, we see from the increasingly positive
coefficient estimates of the year dummies (dum]994 through dum]996) in Table 2 that, between
1992 and 1996, the respondents were increasingly concerned about job security, job loss and
reemployment prospects.21 We also see that when we control for age, education levels, broad
occupational groups and location, women were significantly more concerned than men about job
loss and their prospects of finding comparable employment if they lost their jobs.22
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 We have excluded 1993 from our multivariate analysis because the RLMS did not include
occupational questions in Round 3.
^These two questions are related. In particular, concern over job loss per se may simply
reflect the effect of the introduction of a market economy requiring labor resources to move in
market-determined directions, and may not imply a pronounced hardship for labor if reemployment
prospects are good. That is, job security may decline but labor market security may take its place if a
strong economy provides good alternative employment prospects. The questions examined in Table
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How did women's concern about job loss and reemployment prospects relative to similar
concerns by men vary over time? Table 7 (columns 2 and 3 in the top panel) answers this
question. The estimated coefficients of the interaction between the female and year dummies
reflect changes over time in gender differences with regard to concern about job loss and
reemployment prospects. An insignificant interaction coefficient for a particular year implies
unchanged gender difference in the dependent variable between that year and the base year
•( 1992). For example, the parameter estimate of 0.051 (column 2, row 2) is insignificant,
indicating that there was no change between 1992 and 1994 in the relative concern of women and
men about job loss. The significantly negative coefficients of -.069 and -.017 (rows 3 and 4)
indicate that the greater concern about job loss expressed by women in 1992 (relative to that
expressed by men) actually diminished in 1995 and 1996, i.e. gender differences in concern
about job loss diminished since the start of the transition. Similarly, the estimated interaction
effects (column 3) suggest that the greater concern over reemployment prospects expressed by
women relative to men in 1992 declined more or less monotonically over the course of the
transition.
In other words, while women felt at greater risk of job loss and alternative job prospects
than men throughout the five transition years, and their fears were rising over time, men's
concerns increased more rapidly leading to a partial convergence between the sexes in their
worries over job loss and reemployment prospects. It would seem that, in the earlier stages of the
transition, men might have felt that their jobs were at a lower risk because women were more
likely to be laid off first if employment fell; and/or men might have been more optimistic than
women about the quick emergence of private activity, and might have anticipated a more robust
growth in demand for male labor in the emerging private sector.
In conclusion, our estimates of employment concerns of Tables 2 and 7 suggest a
growing anxiety by workers over the 1992-96 period regarding job security and reemployment
prospects with a greater concern evidenced by women yet with a stronger growth over time in
2 reflect people's concerns and not necessarily their actual experiences. However, to the extent that
these concerns correctly mirror experience, it would seem that job market security is not sufficiently
robust to replace the traditions of job security that were provided under the planned regime.
23
concern evidenced by men.
Job Security and Job Replacement Concerns, and the Impact of Demographic, Occupational and
Location Variables
We first analyze the effect of education and age on people's concerns about job security
and job replacement based on the estimates of Table 2.
Education and Age and Employment Concerns: The "education" estimates of Table 2, based on
a series of dummies (the variables profco through ins_g indicating generally higher levels of
educational attainment), show that people with higher education were generally less anxious
about their jobs and labor market prospects (a negative sign suggests less concern in this regard).
This result is to be expected as the economy increasingly tended to reward skills more than
position and seniority per se.23 We also see that older individuals were more anxious about their
market prospects than younger respondents.24 The transition to a market economy seems to have
weakened seniority job rights. The greater anxiety of older workers regarding labor market
prospects might also result from their recognition that their skills were less valued than the
newer educational vintage of younger workers in view of the introduction of new technology in
response to market forces.25
Regional Variations in Labor Market Prospects: We adopt Moscow and St. Petersburg as the
23See Rutkowski (1996) for evidence that returns (wages) to education increased during even
the early years of the transition in Poland, and Brainerd (1996b) for evidence of increasing returns to
observed skills in Russia, the Ukraine and several East European transition economies. Again, these
education patterns hold for men and women: in regressions not shown (and available on request), we
found consistently insignificant effects from the interaction of education and gender.
24The insignificant quadratic term for \htfindjb regression indicates a linear increase in
concern with age, while the significantly negative quadratic age term in the chanj regression indicates
that concern about job loss rose until about 45 years and then slowly declined.
25These results are also consistent with the Polish experience; Rutkowski (1996) reports that
younger workers were rewarded with higher wages during the transition as the skills of older workers
had depreciated. In future work, we plan to separate these age effects into specific age categories in
order to analyze these concerns in different age groups.
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reference regions for estimating the regional parameters in all of our multivariate tables.26
Therefore, coefficient estimates of Table 2 reflect average values in each region relative to those
held by people in Moscow and St. Petersburg. A a positive (negative) coefficient of the regional
dummy j (column 2) indicates that, on average, people in region j were more (less) concerned
about job loss than people, on average, in Moscow and St. Petersburg. We notice from the
significantly positive coefficients of the regional dummies that concern about job loss and
reemployment prospects were greater in all regions relative to the concern felt in Moscow and
St. Petersburg.27 As the transition proceeded, respondents' concerns over job security and
alternative job possibilities varied from region to region depending on regional industrial
structures and potential for diversification. A striking result from the estimates (column 3) is that
people in all regions were relatively more concerned about finding alternative employment (on
losing their current job) than on losing their present occupation.
Occupational Differences in Labor Market Concerns
We have selected the job description "Service Worker, Market Worker" as the reference
occupation category in order to analyze the labor market impact of the transition on different
occupational groups relative to this service and trading group which has emerged as the most
vigorous and market-oriented.28 As might be expected, the percentage of workers employed in
26Unfortunately, regional comparisons are limited to the eight regions identified in the RLMS
(see appendix Table 1 for details).
27When we look at changes in these regional effects for each year (not shown here, but
available on request) we find that in 1992, compared to Moscow and St. Petersburg residents, people
in a number of regions, on average, exhibited similar concerns about job security or actually felt less
concern about job security and market prospects. However, the anxiety over job loss increased in all
regions relative to concern in Moscow and St. Petersburg from the initial to the final year of the
transition.
The RLMS provides information on a respondent's occupation based on the International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) at the one- and two-digit levels. In this article, we
investigate occupational differences at the one-digit level postponing consideration of two-level
analysis for later work. (Appendix Table 2 provides information on occupational titles.) Glinskaya
and Mroz (1996) discuss wage comparisons in Russia at the one- and select two-digit occupational
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this sector (Occupation 5) increased monotonically from 1992 to 1995 with a slight decline in
1996 as shown in Appendix Table 2.
We take first the fear of job loss by occupation in Table 2 focusing on the statistically
significant estimates. Government employees and senior managers (Occupation 1), professionals
(Occupation 2), technicians and associate professionals (Occupation 3), in addition to military
employees, were less concerned about job loss.29 Recall that for each occupation, the increase or
decrease in concern over job loss is relative to the most, market-oriented occupation in the
service and marketing category. Respondents in the remaining occupations were generally as
worried about job less as the most market-oriented group: these estimates are statistically not
significant and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Except for government employees and
senior managers it is not clear, however, from the estimates (column 3) if they felt less
concerned (than their counterparts in the service and marketing sector) of finding alternative jobs.
Again, all occupation groups were more concerned about their relative (to Moscow and St.
Petersburg) reemployment prospects than of the relative likelihood of losing their jobs. People
felt less insecure about losing their job than about finding another job on losing their current
employment.
The transition also raises the critical issue of job layoffs (involuntary job separation) and
quits (voluntary job separation) which we analyze based on the estimates of Table 3.
Patterns of Voluntary and Involuntary Job Separations
These estimates, which are calculated for those not employed at the time of the survey,30
levels.
29The variable "gov" is distinct from occupational group 1 that includes legislators, as "gov"
indicates that the government is the sole, or partial owner of the enterprise that the respondent is
currently employed at. Workers in these firms were generally more concerned about job loss (Table
2, column 2) than other workers, but these differences were only significant in 1992 and 1995.
Similarly, workers in government-owned firms (Table 2, column 3) were more concerned about
reemployment likelihood except in 1996.
30This variable must be interpreted with caution because it is coded from individual responses
regarding the reason for job separations (which may be inaccurate) rather than from administrative
records of the employing agencies.
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are based on information relating to separation from last job due to the respondents being laid
off as result of plant shutdown or reorganization, or staff reductions; and due to the respondents
quitting the last job for personal or other reasons.31 A positive (negative) parameter in Table 3
(column 2) indicates a greater (lower) likelihood of having quit a job. For example, the negative
"female" coefficient in the quit regression indicates that women were less likely, ceteris paribus,
to have quit their jobs between 1992 and 1993. The parameter estimates in the /ayo#regression
in the last column similarly reflect the effect of each attribute on the likelihood that a respondent
was laid off from his or her job between 1992 and 1993. For example, the insignificant
coefficient associated with the female dummy variable indicates that there was no difference in
the likelihood of layoffs (once again, ceteris paribus) for men and women.
As noted, with regard to involuntary separations (layoffs) (column 3), we see that there
was no difference between women and men in the probability of having been laid off. The more
educated were somewhat surprisingly more likely to have been laid off. These results may well
reflect reduced demand for white collar administrators and bureaucrats coupled with an increased
demand for skilled blue-collar workers (see Gimpelson, 1996). Older workers were less likely to
have been laid off, perhaps due to the persistence of seniority rights during the early years of the
transition. We fail to detect significant variations across regions (relative to Moscow and St.
Petersburg) in layoff probabilities. Managerial resistance against laying off workers did not seem
to vary from region to region.
Concerning trends in layoff probabilities, the significantly negative coefficient estimate of
the 1993 dummy (row 1, column 3) indicates that between 1992 and 1993 workers actually
experienced a decline in the probability of experiencing a layoff. However, we do not find
evidence (column 5, Table 7) of change in the differential effect of gender over the two-year
period in layoff likelihood (once again, among those not employed at the time of the survey).
We now turn to an analysis of voluntary separations (quits). Women were significantly
less likely to have quit their prior job than men shown by the significantly negative coefficient of
3IOther reasons that were given for people having left their prior jobs, but that were not
coded as either a quit or layoff included having left due to health reasons, due to having reached
retirement age, changed to another job, or left for other reasons.
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the female dummy (row 2, column 2, Table 3); again, this gender differential increased between
1992 and 1993 shown by the significantly negative interaction effect (column 4, Table 7).32 This
gender difference in voluntary mobility may have resulted from the relatively lower
representation of women among the skilled blue-collar occupations coupled with the fact, noted
by Gimpelson, that the bulk of quits (among the four firms that he studied) were undertaken by
skilled blue-collar workers. Consistent with Gimpelson's finding, we see that the more educated
were less likely to quit. As expected, older people were also less likely to voluntarily leave their
jobs. This result is consistent with lower returns, ceteris paribus, to mobility as the payoff
period shortens and the mobility-inhibiting effect of firm-specific skills acquired on the prior job
inhibits turnover (assuming that age and tenure are positively correlated, so that age proxies
tenure effects).
Finally, unlike layoffs we see that there are a number of significant regional differences in
quit rates, perhaps reflecting regional differences in labor market opportunities: all regions
except Eastern Siberia and the Far East (Region 8) exhibit lower quit rates than in buoyant
Moscow and St. Petersburg (some of the effects are statistically not significant).
Patterns of Job Tenure
In the second phase of the survey, respondents who were currently employed were asked
a series of questions concerning the initial date of their current job, from which we were able to
create a measure of job tenure. Since tenure is measured in months, the parameters reported in
the last column of Table 4 indicate the relationship between each attribute and the total number
of months with the current employer. For example, the parameter estimate associated with the
dummy variable female means that on average, females had approximately 18.5 years longer
tenure than males (once again, after taking into account the other factors in the regression, i.e.
age, education level, region of residence, and so forth).
We see from these results reported in the last column of Table 4 that the longer job tenure
of women relative to men found in Table la persists when we control for education, age, region,
32The gender effects on quit likelihood are stronger when we include the item "left for health
reasons" in the definition of quits responses (these results are available on request).
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and occupation. This gender pattern is not surprising in view of the results on voluntary
separations reported in Table 3. Men were more mobile and were likely to engage in job search
when they faced wage arrears or falling wages, whereas women had a greater tendency to stay in
their jobs, especially when they were second income earners in the family. We also see, as one
would expect, that older people had a longer tenure on average, and people with more education
had a shorter tenure33. We also observe significant variations in average tenure levels across
regions and occupations, and higher tenure in government-owned firms.
Finally, analyzing tenure over time, we notice that the tenure decline between 1994 and
1996, observed in Table la, is statistically significant when we control for personal attributes,
region and occupation in our multivariate specification (row 2, column 4, Table 4). we also see
from the interactions of gender and the year dummies in Table 7 (column 6) that the gender
differential in tenure between these year had not changed.
We now turn to workers' labor market experiences in terms of forced unpaid leave and
its duration by focusing on the estimates in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.
Patterns of Unpaid Leave and Its Duration
Unpaid leave, on top of flexible wages and work hours, provide Russian firm managers
an additional instrument for managing their personnel. The practice shares some features of
temporary layoffs in the U.S. economy (see Feldstein, 1976): work can be shared within a given
labor force, allowing employers to avoid unpopular layoffs and maintain a labor reserve for
meeting unanticipated increases in demand.34 According to Goskomstat's Labour Force Survey
33
 Because age is held constant, higher education implies later entry into the market.
However, on-the-job training opportunities generally tend to be positively correlated with education
levels and increased ties between workers and firms (to the extent that the training has firm-specific
elements). Therefore, we might expect to find a positive association between education and average
tenure level. The significantly negative education effect, in the Russian context, perhaps resulted
from the more educated workers taking advantage of increased opportunities by changing jobs in
search of higher earnings.
^Gimpelson's observation in one of the four firms that he studied is relevant here: "Since
1993 some if its core workers (mostly women working on the assembly lines) have been on unpaid
vacations on a rotating basis. Thus, for the individual employee the firm has sought to minimize the
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(LFS)35, administrative leave peaked at 2.3 percent of the labor force during the second quarter of
1994, falling continuously to 1.3 percent in the third quarter of 1995, and then rising to 1.4
percent in the fourth quarter of 1995 and to 1.6 percent in the first quarter of 1996.
We first discuss patterns of compulsory unpaid leave before turning to the duration of
such leave. A positive (negative) parameter reported in Table 2 (column 2) means that the
associated attribute tends, on average, to increase (decrease) the likelihood that an individual was
forced to take unpaid leave. For example, the positive coefficient associated with the dummy
variable female indicates that, ceteris paribus, females were more likely than men to have been
forced to take unpaid leave.
We see in Table 4 (column 2) that the likelihood of being forced to take unpaid leave
diminished between 1994 and both 1995 and 1996,36 the decline being stronger between 1994
and 1995 with an increase in the prevalence of unpaid leave practices between 1995 and 1996.
Women were more likely than men to have been forced to take an unpaid leave at some
time in the past (column 2).37 This pattern is consistent with women bearing a greater burden of
duration of unpaid leave; at the same time it maintained the overall numbers on unpaid leave." While
these work-sharing practices have some of the characteristics of temporary layoffs, the absence of
unemployment benefits for workers on administrative leave means that these practices play a very
different role from that played by temporary layoffs in the U.S. Russian workers are likely to favor
contracts that have flexible wages rather than unemployment risks (see Azariadis, 1983).
35Data on underemployment is collected for medium and large sized firms only, covering
roughly 75 percent of the labor force. (The number of workers affected by administrative leave is
calculated by taking the average duration of administrative leave each month and dividing it by the
number of working days.) It may well be the case that smaller firms are less able to engage in work
sharing of this form, and may also have lower incentives to do so if they are relatively newer firms
with fewer redundant workers. Therefore, the official statistics might overstate the prevalence of
administrative leave.
on unpaid leaves was not collected for 1992, the first year of the survey so the base
year used for this analysis is 1994.
37A positive (negative) coefficient indicates a greater (lesser) likelihood of having been forced
to take unpaid leave at some time on the current job.
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the short-run employment adjustments brought on by the transition.38
Concerning the relationship between age and the likelihood of being forced to take unpaid
leave, the positive linear "age" effect indicates that older workers were, on average, more likely
to have been forced to take unpaid leave, yet the significantly negative quadratic term suggests
that the addition in the likelihood of forced unpaid leave diminished with age up to
approximately 44 years, after which the likelihood of being forced to take unpaid leave
diminished with age. This pattern is consistent with increased reliance on more productive,
younger workers in response to the pressures to maintain sales revenue. Again, employees of
government-owned enterprises were less likely to face administrative leave, a result reflecting
weaker restructuring efforts by these firms.
We observe significant differences across regions and occupations in forced unpaid leave
experiences, with several occupations using the practice more than the market-oriented reference
category, a pattern that is to be expected if these occupations have redundant workers and are
parceling out work according to nonmarket practices.
A caveat is in order before we analyze the estimates of Table 4 with respect to the
duration of unpaid leave. The RLMS data present difficulties for empirical analysis of
compulsory leave duration because the sample includes respondents who, having experienced an
unpaid leave spell, were observed as having a job at the time of the survey. We do not observe
leave duration for people who failed to find new employment by the time of the survey, either
because they dropped out of the labor market or because they could not find a new job.
Therefore, the estimates of leave durations are generally biased downward. The sample size is
also small. To the extent that women were less likely than men to find reemployment, or are
more likely to drop out of the market, we would expect the data to underestimate the length of
leave duration for women relative to men perhaps contributing to the insignificant gender
differences. Since dayslv is measured in days, a positive (negative) parameter values indicates
that the associated attribute acted, on average, to increase (decrease) the number of days that a
38The cyclical sensitivity of female employment is greater than that of male employment in
some European economies, the United States and Japan (see Tachibanaki, 1987), results consistent
with the gender patterns of unpaid leave seen in Russia.
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respondent was forced to remain on unpaid leave, conditional on having been forced to take
unpaid leave (i.e., this regression only uses observations for people who were forced to take
unpaid administrative leave). For example, the negative coefficient on the dummy variable
female indicates that on average, females who were forced to take unpaid leave had leave
duration that was approximately six days shorter than leave duration for men who were forced to
take unpaid leave (once again, after controlling for education level, age, and so forth).
Keeping this qualification in mind, we notice that the estimates of unpaid leave
durations (conditional on having been forced to take a leave without pay) in Table 4 (column 3)
by gender, age, education level, occupation and region indicate that women tended to have
shorter leave durations than men; there was no distinct pattern by education level; older workers
generally had longer leave durations; and government workers, while being more likely to
experience a forced unpaid leave, tended to have a shorter leave duration. We also notice that
few of the regional and occupation dummies are significant; however, the joint significance
tests reported at the bottom of Table 4 show that, taken together, each group exerts a significant
effect on leave durations.
Despite these problems, we observe a significant trend in the average leave duration, that
is, a significant increase in average leave duration between 1994 and 1996. In the last column of
Table 7, we see a significant increase in the female/male differential in average leave duration
between 1994 and 1995 (suggested by the positive interaction term between the female dummy
and the 1995 survey year dummy) and a slightly smaller increase between 1994 and 1996.
Patterns in Hours of Work and Short-time Work Schedules
We discussed above the use of administrative leaves by firms as a way of achieving labor
flexibility without resorting to politically and economically costly layoffs. Labor inputs can also
be varied without layoffs is through reductions in hours or work; combined with administrative
leaves, this practice constitutes "hidden unemployment" in the official statistics reported by
Goskomstat (see Russian Economic Trends, various issues). We analyze patterns of average
monthly hours of work and the prevalence of short-time schedules in Table 5.
Turning first to average hours, we noticed earlier in Table lb that monthly hours fell for
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men and women between 1992 and 1994 having moved up slightly in 1995 and 1996, but did not
return to the 1992 levels. This general pattern persists in the multivariate context as suggested by
the coefficients of the year dummies in Table 5, i.e. the parameter associated with the dummy
variable for 1994, duml994, indicates that, after controlling for the other factors taken into
account by the regression, average monthly hours of work were approximately thirteen hours
smaller in 1994 than in 1992. The lower (in absolute values) parameter values for later years, i.e.
-6.771 in 1995 and -4.146 in 1996, indicate that the fall in average monthly hours of work
relative to 1992 was less over time (a decline of approximately seven hours between 1992 and
1995 and a decline of approximately four hours between 1992 and 1996). Women consistently
worked fewer hours than men; we see from the interaction terms in the bottom panel of Table 7
(column 2) that this gender differential significantly increased between 1992 and 1995. It
appears than women were bearing a greater burden than men of reduced work hours in response
to lower demand for labor services as the transition progressed.
Regarding other patterns in work hours, we notice that education had little effect on
hours of work. Hours tended to increase with age up to about 41 years old declining thereafter.
Employees in government-owned firms appeared to consistently work fewer hours than other
workers. We observe significant variations across regions in hours of work with generally lower
hours of work in Moscow and St. Petersburg relative to the other regional groups. Significant
differences obtain across occupational groups with most occupations reporting lower hours of
work than for the Service/Market Worker reference group (the exception being senior managers).
Turning next to short-time schedules, data from the Federal Employment Service (FES)
indicate that short-time work in Russia peaked at 3.5 percent of the labor force in the first
quarter of 1994 falling subsequently to 2.5 percent by the third quarter of 1995 — a pattern
evidently produced by workers increasingly quitting their jobs and moving into the growing
private sector. Later however short-time work became more prevalent, increasing to 3 percent
during the first quarter of 1996 and continuing to rise throughout 1996 (see Russian Economic
Trends, various issues), possibly reflecting continued belt-tightening by firms.
Our results reported in the last column of Table 5 do not fully support these conclusions.
A positive (negative) parameter reported in the last column of Table 5 indicates that the
33
corresponding attribute lead to increased (decreased) likelihood that an individual would work
less than forty hours per month. For example, the positive coefficient of the dummy variable
female indicates that on average, women were more likely than men, ceteris paribus, to work
short-time schedules (i.e. less than forty hours per month). The prevalence of short-time work
increased between 1992 and both 1994 and 1995, with a fall between 1994 and 1995 and no
change between 1992 and 1996. The absence of clear synchronization in the two patterns may
be due to different definitions of short-time work.39 Analyzing the features of this practice across
demographic groups and regions, we notice that women were more likely to be on short-time
schedules than men, a result once again consistent with women bearing the burden of the
adjustment cost of the transition or meeting greater demands on their time due to household
chores. Consistent patterns in short-time schedules by education level are absent. The likelihood
of a short-time schedule tended to decline with age up to about 42 years, then increased with age.
Workers in government- owned firms were more likely to be placed on short-time schedules.
Finally, while few of the regional dummies are significant, the a joint test for the set of regional
dummies taken as a whole is significant, indicating a significant variation in short-time work
across regions. Finally, the Service/Market Worker group was equally or less likely than the
other occupation groups to be on short-time schedules, perhaps suggesting adequate demand for
their services.
The Pattern of Current Nonemployment Spell and Unemployment Incidence
How does the nonemployment spell vary by gender, demographic factors, occupation and
location for people who were unemployed at the time of the survey? These results in Table 6
suggest that women who were not employed at the time of the survey had been without
employment for a longer period than unemployed men. Since the dependent variable in column
2, udury measures the number of months that the individual had been without a job, a positive
(negative) parameter indicates that the associated attribute acted to increase (decrease) the
number of months that a currently not employed individual had been without work. For
39Direct comparisons with official statistics are not possible because short-time work used in
official statistics is not defined in RET
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example, the coefficient of the dummy variable female indicates that on average, women who
were not employed at the time of the survey had been without work for approximately eleven
months longer than men who were without work at the time of the survey. We also see that
nonemployment durations tended to decline with higher levels of educational attainment.
Durations also decreased with age up to about 24 years, and then tended to rise. Finally, we see
distinct regional variations in nonemployment spells, with respondents in most regions
experiencing shorter spells than those experienced by people in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Is there a rising trend in nonemployment duration from 1992 to 1996? The estimates of
the year dummies suggest that there was a general increase in nonemployment duration between
1992 and 1996, although the increase was statistically significant only between 1992 and 1995.40
Finally, we notice in Table 7 (column 4, bottom panel) a significant change over time in the
gender differential in nonemployment durations: there was a significant decline in the differential
between 1992 and 1996. In other word, while women tended to have longer nonemployment
spells than men, this difference narrowed in 1996.
Table 6 reports unemployment occurrence in terms of alternative definitions of
unemployment. In column 3, we use a definition analogous to that employed in the United States
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS): the respondent is unemployed if he or she is without a
job and is actively searching for work (unemjb). Column 4 uses the same definition but requires
that the person is registered as unemployed with a government agency (unemjg). The last
column uses a self-reported definition of unemployment status (unems). In each case a positive
(negative) parameter indicates that the associated attribute increased (decreased) the likelihood
that an individual would be unemployed at the time of the survey. For example, the positive
coefficients of the dummy variable female in columns 3 and 4 indicate that on average, women
were more likely than men to be unemployed at the time of the survey according to the unemjb
and unemjg definitions of unemployment; similarly, the negative coefficient of the dummy
variable female in the last column indicates that women were, on average, less likely than men to
measure of the nonemployment spell between jobs is consistent with data from the
Ministry of Labor reporting that the average duration of the registered unemployed increased from
5.5 months in 1994 to 6.3 months in 1995.
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self-report that they were unemployed at the time of the survey (the variable unems).
Turning first to columns 3 and 4, we see that women consistently had a higher incidence
of unemployment than men, and that this gender differential is stronger for the more restrictive
definition of unemployment that requires registration with a government agency. As might be
expected, we see that older people tended to have a lower incidence of unemployment (though
only in column 3), reflecting greater job seniority or labor force withdrawals. The pattern by
education is not pronounced but we see evidence of lower unemployment likelihood for the most
highly educated workers in column 3. Turning to regional patterns, a number of regions had a
lower prevalence of unemployment than in Moscow and St. Petersburg; when we add the
requirement of registration with the government, the pattern reverses. This result points to
regional differences in the ease with which the unemployed can register with government
agencies and/or regional differences in the amount of unemployment benefits that workers
receive with concomitant regional differences in incentives to register with the government when
unemployed.
We see in the last column that women were less likely than men to report that they were
currently unemployed. The reasons for these differences between the results in the last column
and those in columns 3 and 4 are not immediately obvious; perhaps they are due to the structure
of the questionnaire that allows respondents to self-classify into activities other than unemployed,
such as engaged in various forms of household production. Focusing on changes in
unemployment incidence over the three years in Table, the BLS definition (column 3) has no
trend. There was however an increase in the prevalence of unemployment among respondents
who were registered as unemployed with a government agency (possible due to increases in the
value of unemployment benefits) (column 4) and among people who self-reported that they
were unemployed.
In Table 7, we do not observe a significant change in gender differences in unemployment
incidence for either the unemb or unem_g measures. However, the higher rate of self-reported
unemployment occurrence for women relative to men of Table 6 (unems) seems to have




Our preliminary results suggest diminished job security from 1992 to 96 with women
bearing the greater burden of the adjustment costs of the transition than men. Our principal
findings are the following:
Men and women had increased fear of job loss and increased pessimism about their
reemployment prospects on losing their jobs. While these concerns were stronger for women
than for men in all years, men's concerns grew at a faster rate leading to a partial convergence in
concerns about labor market security for men and women.
The likelihood of being forced to take unpaid leave generally increased over the
transition as did the duration of these involuntary leaves; women were more likely than men to be
forced to take unpaid leave but there was no increase in this pattern over the transition. There
was an increase in the gender differential in leave durations over the course of the transition.
Women experienced longer periods of nonemployment and higher incidence of
unemployment
Women tended to work fewer hours than men and were more likely to be on short-time
schedules than men.
No gender differences in layoff likelihood are seen during the early years of the
transition but women were found to be much less likely to quit than men and this gender
differential in quit likelihood increased between 1992 and 1993.
Women tended to have longer job tenure than men reflecting less female employment
mobility. Both groups experienced a decline in average tenure levels between 1994 and 1996
suggesting increased job turnover for working men and women.
We also found demographic, occupational and regional differences in a number of our
labor market security measures. In particular, the more educated faced less job security and job
insecurity tended to increase with age.
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Table la: Perceived Job Security and Actual Turnover Patterns,
Univariate Comparisons































































































NOTES: Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. Superscripts a,b,c, and
d denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between, a. males and females
(marked on the female means in the top panel), b. 1992 and 1996, c. 1992 and 1993, and d.
1994 and 1996.
See Appendix Table 1 for detailed variable definitions.
Table lb: Administrative Leaves and Underemployment Patterns,
Univariate Comparisons























































































NOTES: Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c
denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between, a. males and females (marked
on the female means in the top panel), b. 1992 and 1996, c. 1993 and 1996, and d. 1994 and
1996.
See Appendix Table 1 for detailed variable definitions.
Table lc: Unemployment Patterns,
Univariate Comparisons



























































































NOTES: Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. Superscripts a and b
denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between, a. males and females (marked
on the female means in the top panel), b. 1992 and 1996, and c. 1994 and 1996.
Nonemployment duration means are calculated for nonemployment spells of 5 years of less,
and for respondents no older than 55 years.
See Appendix Table 1 for detailed variable definitions.
Table 2: Fear of Job Loss (chanf)


















































































Table 2: Fear of Job Loss (chanj)








































































NOTES: Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The
regressions are estimated with maximum likelihood ordered probit. Rows jt. testl, 2, and 3
report chi-square statistics for joint significance tests of education, region and occupation.
Superscripts a,b, and c denote significance levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent,
respectively. (All specifications additionally include a constant.)



































































































NOTES: Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in
parentheses (probabilities for female are reported in brackets). Both
regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood probits. Rows jt.
testl and 2 report chi-square statistics for a joint significance test of
education and region. Superscripts a,b,c, and d denote significance
levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent respectively.

























































































































































































































NOTES: Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The
complv regression is estimated by maximum likelihood probit, the dayslv regression
is estimated by maximum likelihood tobit, and the tenure regression in estimated by
ordinary least squares. Rows jt. testl, 2, 3 report chi-square statistics for a joint
significance test of education, region, and occupation. Superscripts a,b,c, and d
denote significance levels of 1, 5,10, and 15 percent respectively. (All specifications
additionally include a constant.)

























































































































































NOTES: Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The hours
regression is estimated by ordinary least squares, the shours regression is estimated by
maximum likelihood probit. Rows jt. testl, 2, and 3 report chi-square statistics for joint
significance tests of education, region and occupation. Superscripts a,b, and c denote















Table 6: Duration in Months Since Last Employed (udur)























































































































Table 6: Duration in Months Since Last Employed (uduf)





























































NOTES: Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The udur
(duration in months since last employed) regression is estimated by maximum likelihood tobit.
The remaining regressions, unemjb (=1 if unemployment using a criteria comparable to that
employed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the U.S.), unemjg (=1 if unemployed and
registered with the government), unems (=1 if self-reported unemployment status), are all
estimated by maximum likelihood probit. Rows jt. testl and 2 report chi-square statistics for
joint significance tests of education and region. Superscripts a,b, and c denote significance
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Definitions / and Survey Questions
"How concerned are you that you might lose your job?" The four possible
responses range from a value of 1 for the response "not at all concerned" to a
value of 4 for the response "very concerned".
"Imagine this not very pleasant scene: the enterprise or organization where
you work for some reason will close tomorrow, and all workers will be laid
off. How certain are you that you will be able to find work, no worse than
your present position?" The five possible responses range from a value of 1
for the response "quite confident" to a value of 5 for the response "not at all
confident".
Layoff=1 if the answer to the question "Why did you leave your job?" was
due to a shutdown or reorganization of the enterprise, or due to staff
reductions.
Quit=l if respondents answered that they left because they "did not want to
stay on that job or left for personal reasons"; zero otherwise.
"Tell me, please, since what year and month have you been working at this
place?" Using the interview date and month, we calculate the number of
months employed at the current job.
"Has the administration at any time sent you on compulsory unpaid leave?",
which is coded as 1 if the answer is yes, 0 if the answer is no.
"How many calendar days, without a break, did this leave last or has it
lasted?", which is coded as missing for people who were never forced to take
unpaid leave.
"How many hours did you actually work at your primary place of
employment in the last 30 days?" Responses are deleted if people say that
they worked more than 300 hours per month.
=1 if average monthly hours of work are less than or equal to 40.
"How many months ago did you leave your last place of work?", which is
coded as missing for people who are currently employed and those who
never held a job. The analysis is restricted to nonemployment spells of 5
years or less, and for respondents no older than 55 years.
=1 if the respondent is without a job and indicates that he/she wants to find a
job, and has applied for a job (searched for work) in the month prior to the
survey (BLS definition).
=1 if unem_b=l and applied for work with a state agency (gov. definition).
=1 if respondent indicates that his/her primary occupation at the time of the
survey is temporarily not employed (for reasons other than caring for a child
or other family members) and looking for a job"






























=1 for year 199i (1=3,4,5,6)
=1 for female
=1 if no training besides secondary school (reference category)
=1 for professional courses (e.g. chauffeuring, typing, accounting)
=1 for technical school training courses without a secondary education
=1 for technical school training courses with a secondary education
=1 for technical, medical, music, pedagogical, art school
=1 for institute, university, academy, graduate school, residency
age in years (restricted to between 16 and 65 years old)
=1 if government is the sole or partial owner of the employing firm
=1 for a Legislator, Senior Manager, Official
=1 for a Professional
=1 for a Technician, Associate Professional
=1 for a Clerk
=1 for a Service Worker, Market Worker (reference group)
=1 for a Craft or Related Trades
=1 for a Plant or Machine Operator or Assembler
=1 for in an Elementary (Unskilled) Occupation
=1 for in the Army
=1 for Moscow and St. Petersburg (reference group)
=1 for Northern and North Western
=1 for Central and Central Black Earth
=1 for Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin
=1 for North Caucasus
=1 for the Urals
=1 for Western Siberia
































































































































































































































NOTE : Means (proportions) are reported with standard deviations in parentheses.
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